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Abstract
SSA appears to be the second most affected region of the world by
brain drain behind Caribbean; size of brain drain in SSA has been increasing
overtime from 14.2% in 1980 to 17.4% in 2010. Moreover, it was more than
2 times the size in developing countries globally and more than 3 times the
size at the world level. This study evaluates the net economic consequences
of brain drain to determine whether SSA countries are net winners or net
losers and then, how the net effect evolves overtime in a static comparative
perspective. We show that SSA as a whole is a net winner but with gains
declining overtime; at regional level, Southern and Western Africa are net
winners with net gains declining overtime while Middle and Eastern Africa
started net winners but end up net losers. We also show that there are more
winners than losers, but the number of losers has been increasing (from 4 in
1980 to 20 countries in 2010) and the winners decreasing. Futhermore, we
hightlight the persistence of losses in the sense that once a country becomes
a net loser, it remains in that situation. Finally, We show that threshold size
of BD in SSA is structurally explained by the increasing pattern of losses
and decreasing pattern of gains with respect to the size of brain drain. This
threshold stands between 20% and 25%.
JEL Classifications: D62, F22, F24, H22, J24, 015
Keywords: Brain drain, SSA, Net effect, Winners, Losers, Threshhold
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1 Introduction
Until the late 1960s, there was an international consensus on the issue of
South-North migration of elites, which was seen as an investment on the future.
After the colonial and postcolonial periods, when it was practically instituted that
children of the local elites should go abroad in developed countries to study and
then take over from the colonial administrations, emigration for studies was con-
sidered as being one of the strong points of proactive development policies. In
due course, this should enable countries of origin to build up a sufficiently large
and qualified pool of human resources to stimulate development through the de-
ployment of the educational system, technological development, improved health,
among other things. However, while study abroad was widely viewed favorably
in the aftermath of independence, it was still only a necessary evil until countries
were able to institutionalize their higher education system.
Indeed, Africa experienced a particularly active phase of institutional cre-
ation (higher education and research institutions) during the 1970s and 1980s,
accompanied by an explosion in the university population and a strong growth
in the number of researchers (Gaillard and Waast, 1988). But it became clear in
the mid-1980s that the cost of higher education were becoming problematic and
were competing dangerously with those of primary and secondary education, even
though the latter were proving to be more productive than those of higher educa-
tion (World Bank, 1986). As a result of the economic crisis of the 1980s, programs
for institutionalization of higher education were being revived, with the result that
the temporary hope for dependence on northern education systems was increasing
and the rate of attrition was accelerating as more and more young graduates (from
secondary or university undergraduate level) had to seek ways to continue their
studies abroad.
It gradually became apparent that the massive emigration of students from
South was not compensated by a counter flow of return. As a result, the notion of
exodus became necessary. Today, we are no longer talking only about students, but
about professional trained in African universities and who respond to the demands
of a globalized labor market. However, we have come out of the controversy that,
during the 1950s, animated the debate around the questions of ”losses” or ”gains”
that made the heyday of the famous ”brain drain controversy” (Das, 1971) where
two strands were clashing: the ”internationalists” and the ”nationalist” (Adams,
1968). The ”internationalists”, supporting the liberal economy, analyzed this mi-
gration to the North as a normal phenomenon in an international market because,
according to them, skills go where their remuneration and productivity are op-
timal. The ”nationalists” supported their thesis with arguments based on two
assumptions: 1) international economy does not allow an equitable distribution
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of skills (which go to the North and are cruelly lacking in the South); 2) migra-
tory movements of skills are artificial because they are induced by the selective
migration policies of the host countries, with a direct objective of profit. In many
developed countries, highly skilled workforce (employed in knowledge- intensive
activities) is recruited from poor or emerging countries and examples abound. If
we can believe Brucker et al(2013) dataset, in 2010, in 161,out of 47 Sub Saharan
African (SSA) countries with available data, highly skilled workers represented
50% or more of the expatriates living in OECD2 countries; while they were only 43
in 1980. At least 10 SSA countries experienced large physician brain drain ranging
from 21% with Malawi up to 51% in Liberia (Bhargava et al,2010). In those two
countries, more than 10 physicians should be trained to expect 4 to remain in the
country. According to UNESCO4, every year, some 23 000 university graduates
and 50 000 managers leave sub-Saharan Africa. More than 40 000 Africans PhD
graduates are currently living outside Africa. Moreover, as argued by Benedict and
Upkere (2012), around 40 percent of some Africa’s brightest minds live outside of
the continent. Taking the case of skilled migration toward United States, Kevin
(2016) highlighted the fact that overall emigration flows of highly skilled Africans
more than doubled between 1980 and 2010.
This situation raises on the one hand an important question regarding the
consequences of this human capita flight in SSA, and on the other hand the ques-
tion of whether positive effects of brain drain compensate its negative effects in
the sending countries. Also the question of the pattern of this net effect overtime
is raised. Except the recent trial by Docquier (2017) for the year 2010, the existing
empirical literature has not yet properly addressed this issue such as to come out
with an adequate answer which is to our view crucial design of adapted policy
required to minimize loss of losers and mazime gains for winners.
As documented by Brucker et al (2013), over the period 1980-2010, skilled
emigration rate all over the world remains almost stable (from 4.9% in 1980 to
5.3% in 2010) while it has been incresaing quite rapidly in SSA (from 14.2% in
1980 to 17.4% in 2010) making SSA the second most affected region of the world
after the Caribbean (Brucker et al, 2013) with its brain drain in 2010 amounting
more than 3 times the world average level (5.3%) and more than 2 times the de-
veloping countries average level (8.0%). Out of the 47 countries for which data
are available, those exhibiting more than 20% brain drain moved from 13 to 24
between 1980 and 2010; in other words, 51% of SSA countries experienced a level
1Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan,Tanzania, Zambia and Rwanda
2Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
3Lesotho, Liberia, Namibia and Rwanda
4United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
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of brain drain in 2010 high enough to becomes detrimental for them in the sense
of Beine et al, (2008a). Those with more than 15% moved from 15 to 27 repre-
senting 57.4% of SSA countries. Putting in another way, the number of countries
experiencing a low brain drain (BD below 15%) in SSA has been declining (from
32 in 1980 to only 20 countries in 2010). Those observations raise an important
question: What is the net impact of brain drain in SSA countries? In
other words, are negative effects of brain drain fully compensated by
its positives effects?
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the net effect of brain drain
in SSA over the period 1980 - 2010 for each country and each region. In order
to achieve this goal, on the one side we evaluate the economic loss due to brain
drain and on the other side, we evaluate the economic gain generated by skilled
emigration in source countries. First, in order to evaluate skilled emigration loss,
we use the labour demand - labour supply model introduced by Borjas(1995) and
which has been adapted to emigration by Mishra (2007) in which we include ed-
ucation subsidies and change the production function from a linear form into a
C.E.S form. We have considered three scenarios: i) skilled emigration loss in ab-
sence of externality, ii) skilled emigration loss in presence of externalities and iii)
skilled emigration loss in presence of externalities and education subsidies. The
third scenario gives the most complete skilled emigration loss function that we
then estimate. Our quantitative assessment shows that the mechanical loss due to
the reduction of the size of skilled labour force and the external effect it has on the
productivity of those left behind both skilled and unskilled constitute the main
share of losses in SSA while losses from education subsidies are rather limited.
In order to evaluate the skilled emigration gain, we first estimate remittances
from skilled migrants and then we use development accounting model to account
for i) endogenized education decision and ii) diaspora externalities. Once account-
ing for the three feedbacks mechanisms (remittances from skilled migrants, endog-
enized education decisions and diaspora externalities), it appears remittances are
the lowest component of the brain gain and that endogenized education decisions
constitute the main component of brain gain especially in countries combining low
brain drain and low per capita income. But it declines with the size of brain drain
and the level of development. It also reveals that gains from diaspora externalities
increases with the size of brain drain and level of developement and outweigh gains
from endogenized education decisions in countries exibiting more than 25% brain
drain and with per capita income above 4000$
In short, we derive net effect (either net brain loss or net brain gain) by
substracting brain loss to brain gain. It appears that remittances alone cannot
offset losses from brain drain. In addition, a simple average analysis indicates that
SSA is on average a net winner for the entire period covered by this study. At the
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regional level, Southern Africa and Western Africa are net winners while Middle
Africa and Eastern Africa end up being net losers (from 2005). But when those
gains are weighted by the population size, both SSA and the differents regions
are net winners. This mainly comes from the fact that five large countries (D.R.
Congo,Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania) which account for 49.2% of
SSA population are net winners and drive the results. In addition, it appears that
there are more winners than losers. But these ”a priori” optimistic results hide a
very critical situation. Despite the fact that SSA has been a net winner for the
entire period covered, those gains have been severely declining (from 12.8% of per
capita income gain in 1980 to 1.2% in 2010) and this decreasing pattern is observed
for all the regions (EA, MA, SA and WA). Even if there are more winners than
losers, the number of losers is increasing with the natural consequence of a decrease
in the number of winners and losses appear to be persistent in the sens that once
a country becomes a loser, it remains there (there are only two exceptions which
are Liberia and Mozambique).
The rest of the study is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the ex-
isting literature, section 3 presents the magnitude of brain drain in SSA, section
4 presents the structural model developped in order to evaluate the net effect of
brain drain, section 5 presents how parameters are calibrated, section 6 presents
and discuss results and section 7 concludes.
2 Economic impact of Brain drain in source coun-
tries: A literature review
This section will provide an overview of the existing literature on the conse-
quences of brain drain in the source countries. It will explore both theoretical and
empirical literature. It is possible to identify three main strands of this literature:
neutral strand (1), pessimistic strand (2) and optimistic strand (3).
2.1 Neutral strand of the 1960s
This view has been conducted in the late 1960s with authors such as Grubel
and Scott (1966); Johnson (1967); Berry and Soligo (1969). It concluded that
skilled migration were neutral in terms of compensating for the loss in human
capital linked to migrants’ departure by remittances and/or assets left behind.
Thus, brain drain was considered at that time to be marginal and without much
consequences.
In fact, the argument that a country loses from the brain drain is most
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nearly always valid when a country whose national objective is to maximize its
economic performance. From this point of view, brain drain reduces the country’s
mobilizable human capital and its national output is lowered by the amount the
emigrants contributed to it. But, this view of national losses is ”outmoded” and
unrealistic because economic performance depends not so much in aggregate na-
tional output as it does on per capita income which may or not be affected by an
individual emigration. In the place of this ”outmoded” perspective, Grubel and
Scott (1966), suggested to use another perspective according to which a country
is an association of individuals. The country’s leader objective is to maximize
the collective welfare. Here, the most important determinant of welfare in the
long run is standard of living. Brain drain will increase this standard of living
under two conditions: first, if the emigrant improves its own income once abroad;
and second, if the emigrant’s departure does not reduce the income of those left
behind. For the traditional analysis, labor migration raises the long run average
income of those left behind. But, in case of skilled migration, this conclusion does
not hold if human capital embodied in the emigrant is greater than the country’s
total per capita endowment of human and physical capital. This assume perfect
substitutability in these two forms of capital in the long run. In this case, brain
drain reduces total income to be distributed among residents, which leads to the
reduction in per capita income and thereafter to the reduction of the welfare in
that country. In a market economy where individuals are paid their marginal
product, such a reduction in per capita income is only a statistical phenomenon
which has no influence on the welfare of those left behind. There may be income
redistribution effect through changes in the marginal product of the remaining
people, but since a small number of people are involved in the brain drain, these
effects are likely to be small enough to be safely considered as being ”negligible”.
Moreover, negative apprehension of brain drain is above all a nationalis-
tic apprehension by which economic welfare is viewed in terms of welfare of the
residents as being totally excluded from that of the outside world. This view com-
pletely ignores the principle that in every transaction, there is both a demand and
a supply (Johnson, 1967). Under an international trade framework, this author
concluded that brain drain is unlikely to produce world loss, and is rather likely
to produce substantial increases in the world economic welfare. Any possibility
of world loss must hinge on a loss of externalities to the country of emigration,
unmatched by an offsetting gain of externalities to the country of immigration,
and quantitatively large enough to outweigh the private income gains of the mi-
grant. Two theoretical possibilities of such loss of externalities may be presented:
(i) Individuals who might have made scientific discoveries or introduced improved
methods of production or management that would have substantially increased the
productivity of resources in developing countries, may be diverted to higher paid
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activities of a more routine nature lacking such externality beneficial effects. But,
one may also think that the country of emigration may have lacked the resources
or failed to provide the social and economic climate necessary to successful innova-
tion. In some cases, the individual migrates only because a developed country can
provide him the required resources to solve his research problem or the freedom
to experiment new production and management ideas. In other words, emigra-
tion may be the only way for an individual to create a positive externality for his
home country. (ii) Members of a particular profession may generate externalities
in a developing country that they do not generate in developed country. In this
setting, brain drain will be a world loss if the contribution to world output does
not outweigh their contribution when they were in their home country.
As a result, in a market economy, effects of brain drain must be sought
only either in short run adjustment cost or in market failures. In addition, long
run effects on welfare are associated with free market failure to allocate resources
efficiently and the two main sources of such inefficiencies are externalities5 and
governmental education subsidies6 . But, externality only imposed short run cost
of adjustment and migrants provide remittances, support their native countries
through counsels and advices (Grubel and Scott, 1966; Johnson, 1967) and most
often, they have left assets behind (Berry and Soligo, 1969).
2.2 Pessimistic view of the 1970s
Central results of neutral view stating that brain drain should not be a
worry as skilled migrant will only take away the value of its marginal product
which himself earns anyway, can be subject to strong limitations. As argued by
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), there are three important limitations to this view.
5The market fails properly to compensate the individuals for the contributions they make to
society. These externalities are usually associated with personal characteristics of the emigrants
and not their profession. For example, doctor work contains a large measure of social benefits
for which he is not compensated. If he migrates, these benefits are lost to the society only for
the length of time required to train another medical doctor; brain drain thus impose only short
run frictional cost to society and which disappear in the long run
6This category of losses stems from market failure remedied through activities of government.
It is alleged that brain drain affect others mostly through changes in the cost of providing such
government services. It is frequently suggested that public education is a social investment
in individuals which emigrants fail to repay. But this ”debt to society” (Grubel and Scoot,
1966) is based on misapprehension. In fact, society is a continuing organism, and the process of
financing education represent an intergeneration transfer of resources under which the currently
productive generation taxes itself to educate the young who in turn upon maturity provide for the
next generation of children and so on. More importantly, average burden of financing education
falling on the emigrant generation is not changed by his departure, because he takes along not
only his contribution to tax revenue, but also his children, on whom this share of revenue would
have been spent.
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First, for large rather than infinitesimal shifts of labor, there would still be a loss
for those left behind. Second, if social returns exceed private returns because of
strong externalities, then again, there is a loss for those left behind. And third,
if government has subsidized the education which is embodied in the skilled indi-
vidual who migrates and if government would have taxed this skilled individual
(realistic with progressive taxation) partially or wholly to recover the return on
this investment, then, his emigration does deprive those left behind of this return
and thus worsens their welfare.
Thus, this second strand will contrast a bit with the neutral’s one. It
explores the welfare effect of brain drain on those left behind in a more realis-
tic setting. Studies conducted under this strand considered domestic labor market
rigidities (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974), informational imperfection (Hamada and
Bhagwati, 1975) and fiscal losses (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Bhagwati and Ro-
driguez, 1975) which have been introduced to emphasize the negative consequences
of the brain drain on source countries. Brain drain was viewed as contributing to
the increased inequality between developing and developed countries (McCulloch
and Yellen, 1977) most often through important reduction in human capital al-
ready lacking in such countries (Haque and Kim, 1995) as well as other negatives
consequences highlighted earlier.
Labor market rigidies: If the foreign wage level is taking into account
when computing the expected wage of educated labor, this will increase the sup-
ply of educated labor and reduce national income by the incremental educational
cost. If the foreign wage level is high enough, we could also have an increased
unemployment of educated labor and reduced per capita income. The induced
wage-increase of educated labor, further national income will also be likely to
reduce. There could also have a ”leap-frogging process” such that the wage of
uneducated labor could rise in response to the rise in wage of educated labor. The
net effect in this case can be to reduce the supply of educated labor. Thus, even
in the absence of externalities, brain drain can easily lead to unfavorable effect on
national income, per capita income and unemployment of educated labor.
Informational imperfection: In a very simplified form, ”screening the-
ory of education”7 states that education is important, not so much because it
increases the productivity of workers, but mainly because it plays the role of sig-
naling efficient labor from labor in general. Hamada and Bhagwati (1975) used
this approach and considered the case where brain drain serves to identify and thus
screen, the more efficient from the less efficient workers. Then, if domestic market
cannot discriminate as effectively as the international market for professionals, so
the economy tends to lose because emigrants are picked up from the category of
7Developed by Arrow (1973) and Spence (1974)
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the more efficient. So, since emigrants are chosen from the highly gifted category
that domestic market fails to identify, brain drain could cause a welfare loss even
with flexible wage rates.
Fiscal loss8: Educated emigrants do not pay taxes in their home country
once they left. As education is partly or wholly subsidized by the government,
emigrants leave before they can repay their ”debt to society”. This fiscal loss is
likely to be increased by distortion in the provision of public education away from
general skills when graduates emigrate with the source country ending up educat-
ing few physicians, engineers, scientists and too many lawyers, accountants.
Increased inequality between developing and developed countries9
: By increasing the technological gap between developed and developing countries
through the concentration of human capital in developed countries, brain drain
exacerbate inequality between rich and poor countries.
Reduction in human capital: Brain drain is likely to reduce the growth
rate of the human capital that remains in the economy and hence generates a per-
manent reduction in per capita growth in the home country as alleged by Haque
and Kim (1995).
2.3 The optimistic strand of the mid 1990s
Due to the importance of human capital accumulation for economic per-
formance in an economy, the pessimistic view has alleged that brain drain may
leave developing countries in a kind of ”poverty trap”. This might be explained
by the fact that the average level of human capital in the origin country (mainly
developing country) will not grow because destination countries (mainly developed
countries) will divert their highly educated workers, thus increasing the produc-
tivity of the developed countries at the expense of the developing countries. But,
in the mid-1990s, a third strand of studies on development impact of brain drain
in source countries has emerged. It builts its argument around the fact that, when
emigration is not a certainty, brain drain can foster human capital accumulation,
rising the productivity and consequently enhance economic performance in the
source countries creating the possibility of a beneficial brain drain with ”brain
effect”10 dominating ”drain effect”11 (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al, 1997, Beine et
al, 2001).
In fact, if future emigration is not a certainty, and if the probability to
migrate is not too high, brain drain would be likely to enhance human capital
8See Docquier (2014)
9See Docquier (2014)
10Migration prospects foster investment in human capital due to higher return abroad.
11Actual migration flows reduced the available stock of human capital
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accumulation in the source country and then increase productivity. The rise in
human capital accumulation (Mountford, 1997; Beine et al, 2001) driven by the
rise in expected return of education also leads to an endogenous formation of edu-
cational classes (Mountford, 1997). From this perspective, brain drain may well be
viewed as a ”disguise blessing” (Stark et al, 1997) since it can result in a brain gain
because of opportunities it creates, incentives in education investment it increases
and information it provides for the identification and differentiation of individuals’
productivities (Stark et al, 1997)12. Globally, there will be an optimal level of brain
drain which weights the benefits of emigration with the cost of skill depletion of a
brain drain. This might legitimate the use of emigration quota policies in source
countries.
By relying on Haque and Kim (1995); Mountford (1997), Beine et al (2001)
evaluated the impact of brain drain on human capital formation and growth in
small opened developing economies, their results suggested that beneficial brain
drain was possible. Their empirical investigation evidenced that beneficial brain
drain dominates in developing countries under a global perspective (even if there
were more losers than winners in terms of countries).
So far, the existing literature presented has been at the first stage descrip-
tive (neutral view) and at a second stage theoretical (pessimistic and optimistic
views) except the study by Beine et al (2001) which was both theoretical and
empirical. After the pioneering study by Beine et al (2001), a wide range of em-
pirical literature has tried to address the issue of impact of brain drain in source
countries. Those studies have tried to investigate how brain drain affects human
capital formation (Beine et al, 2007; 2008a), economic growth (Beine et al, 2003;
Schiff,2006), welfare of those left behind (Di Jiovani et al, 2015; Schiff, 2006; 2018),
offseting capacity of remittances (Mishra, 2007) and overall net effect of brain drain
(Docquier, 2017). Those studies suggest that brain drain enhance human capital
formation and economic growth in source countries combining low level of human
capital and low skilled emigration rate while countries with high skilled emigration
12Using three important considerations such as opportunities, incentives and information,
Stark et al (1997) showed that brain drain might rather be a disguised blessing since it could re-
sult in a brain gain in origin countries. In fact, faced with an opportunity to migrate and receive
higher expected returns to investment in human capital, some workers in home countries acquire
human capital and migrate. Employers in destinations countries initially pay all migrant workers
the same wage based on the average product of the group of migrants. After identifying individ-
ual skills, employers adjust their wage payments to individual productivities such that relatively
low skill-workers enjoy a pre-discovery high wage, but a lower wage following discovery. Such a
wage is likely to prompt return migration by these workers. To end up, brain gain may occur
without recourse to the argument that the gain arises from new skills that are acquired abroad
and are brought home upon return. Since prospective migration favorably alters the incentives
of poor’s countries workforce to invest in human capital, origin countries’ governments should
reconsider before engaging on measures that hinder migration.
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rate (above 20%) and proportion of highly educated in the total population above
5%. In terms of countries, they observed more losers than winners while in terms
of population size, winners represent nearly 80% of the total population. It effects
on welfare is rather ambiguous because even if brain drain induce net brain gain,
source countries’ residents are worse off under the brain drain than under a closed
economy in many scenarios.13 When residents are better off under migration, it is
mainly through remittances in some large recipient countries14, but, on average,
remittances do not offset negative consequences of brain drain. By adding endoge-
nized education decision and diaspora externality to remittances, Docquier (2017)
concluded that all the developping countries with per capita income below 6000$
are net winners.
3 Magnitude of brain drain in Sub Saharan Africa:
insights from recent data
3.1 How big is brain drain in SSA overtime and with re-
spect to the rest of the world?
In 1975, United Nations Conference on Trade and Developement (UNTACD)
estimated South-North skilled migration over the period 1961 - 1972 to be around
only 300 000 individuals. Two decades later in 1990, US census estimated at 2.5
million highly skilled immigrants from developing countries living in United States.
After Carrington and Detragiache (1998) as well as well as Docquier and Marfouk
(2006) who tried to construct a wide dataset on immigration in OECD countries
by level of education in 1990 for the first and 1990 as well as 2000 for the second,
Brucker et al (2013) constructed an innovative panel dataset for 195 countries
from 1980 to 2010 with 5 years interval in 20 OECD countries. Their data showed
that the total number of skilled migrants from SSA living in OECD increased in
a very sustainable way from 0.18 million in 1980 to 1.7 million in 2010 and those
data strongly support the idea that there is a strong negative correlation between
brain drain and the size of the population. In the remainder of this study, data
considered on brain drain are from Brucker et al (2013).
As presented in table 1, at the world level, size of brain drain has remained
almost constant (from 4.9% in 1980 to 5.3% in 2010) and this dynamic has been
13Schiff (2018) compare resident’s welfare for an open versus closed economy under the presence
or absence of education externality(1), with or without government intervention(2) and equal
government concern for residents and migrants or greater for residents(3)
14Di Giovani et al, 2015
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kept to some extend in developping countries which experienced a small increase
in the size of brain drain (from 6.8% in 1980 to 8.0% in 2010). At the same time,
SSA experienced a quite rapid increase in the size of brain brain moving from
14.2% in 1980 to 17.4% in 2010. So, size of brain drain in SSA was far above the
world level (more than three time in 2010) as well as the developping countries
level (more than 2 time in 2010). Moreover, in 2010, SSA was the second most
affected region by brain drain (17.4%) behind Caribbean (56%); When Caribbean
and Latin America are putting together (13.2%), SSA becomes the most affected
region of the world.
Table 1: Distribution of Brain Drain by region in the world (1980 - 2010)
World distribution (BD) 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World 4.9% 4.8% 4.2% 4.1% 4.1% 5.0% 5.3%
Developing countries 6.8% 7.0% 6.5% 6.2% 6.5% 7.8% 8.0%
East Asian and Pacific 5.0% 5.2% 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% 5.2% 4.8%
Europe and Central Asia 3.2% 3.1% 2.8% 3.7% 4.5% 6.8% 7.7%
Latin America and Caribbean 8.6% 10.4% 10.6% 9.5% 9.9% 12.4% 13.2%
Middle East and North Africa 18.4% 16.1% 13.3% 11.5% 10.7% 10.4% 9.9%
South Asia 4.2% 3.7% 3.1% 3.6% 3.7% 5.1% 5.3%
Caribbean 49.3% 55.3% 55.9% 53.8% 52.3% 55.9% 56.9%
Sub Saharan Africa 14.2% 15.0% 14.9% 12.9% 14.0% 16.2% 17.4%
Source: Brucker, Capuano and Marfouk (2013)
This overall analysis hide a lot of disparities across SSA countries groups
with respect to different characteristics (population size, income group and re-
gions).
3.2 Size of brain drain in SSA by demographic, income
and geographic characteristics
In order to make a kind of ”anatomy” of brain drain in SSA over the considered
period, we decompose SSA as depicted in table 2 below. Table 2 and figure 1
below provide us such an ”anatomy”.
When comparing skilled emigration rates by country size, it appeared that,
in SSA over the period 1980 - 2010, all the country groups have experienced an
increase in brain drain (BD) whatever the size of their population. But still, large
countries (more than 25 million inhabitants) experienced the smallest increase in
BD (2.4% increase on average per year) while small countries (between 2.5 and
10 million inhabitants) experienced the highest increase in BD (9.9% increase on
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average per year). Medium (between 10 and 25 million inhabitants) and very small
countries (less than 2.5 million inhabitants) experienced relatively large increase in
BD (5.7% and 7.2% on average per year respectively). Large countries experienced
both a low increase in the BD and the smallest level of observed BD suggesting
that brain drain decreases as the size of population increases. Albeit large coun-
tries exhibited low brain drain and low increase in BD, the share of skilled among
the migrants’ population represented on average 50% of total of their emigrants
while it was only 34%, 40.9% and 38.1% respectively for medium, small and very
small countries. Moreover, large countries experienced the second fastest increase
in the skilled migrants compared to unskilled (6.3%) behind medium countries
(7.3%). In overall, it appeared that for large and medium countries, the pattern
of brain drain has not been monotonic. After a period of increase (1980-1990), it
declines (1990-1995) and then starts rising (1995-2010). But for small and very
small countries, the trend has been quite monotonic: brain drain has been increas-
ing over the entire period covered (1980 - 2010).
When comparing skilled emigration rates by income group, it appeared
that, while upper middle income countries (UMIC) experienced a 4.9% decline
in brain over the covered period (from 18.04% in 1980 to 13.37% in 2010), high
income countries (HIC) by 2.7% (53.4% to 62.6%), low income countries (LIC)
by 4.9% (from 15.2% to 20.3%) and lower middle income countries (LMIC) by
5.4% (from 12.1% to 16.6%) experienced an increase in BD. Moreover, LMIC has
been the income group which experienced the fastest increase in BD . This sup-
ports the idea that in LMIC, skilled individuals have both incentives and means
to emigrate. The interpretation of HIC group is hard because it contents only one
country (Seychelles). Considering the share of skilled in the migrants’ population
suggests that middle income group (lower and upper) from 1990 up to 2010 ex-
perienced a migrants’ population with more than half being skilled. moreover,the
experienced the fastest increase in the skilled composition (10.3% and 6.7% for
upper and lower middle income countries respectively). But it remains that all
the income groups have experienced a change in skill composition of migrants in
favour of skilled individuals.
When comparing skilled emigration rate by region, it appeared that while
Southern Africa experience an average yearly decline in BD by 3.1% (from 17.0% in
1980 to 11.9% in 2010), the remaining regions experienced an important increase in
BD by 4.9%, 4.8% and 4.8% respectively for Eastern, Western and Middle Africa).
In other words, execepts Southern Africa, the dynamic of BD in SSA has been
almost identical. Moreover, the structure of migrants’ population accross regions
indicated that more than 50% of migrants from Eastern, Western ans Southern
Africa were skilled migrants in 2010 and this represented almost 40% in Middle
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Africa. Dynamic of skill composition of migrants in favour of skilled individuals
indicated that Southern Africa has experienced the most rapid change in migrant
composition in favour of skilled on the covered period (8.4%) while Middle Africa
has eperienced the slowest change in skill composition of the migrants (2.8%). Es-
tern and Western Africa experienced a relatively large change in skill composition
(6.5% and 6.2% respectively).
From figure 1 below, one may see that the number of skilled migrants
has been increasing over the entire period covered by this study. We might also
highlight three regimes with different slopes: the first regime hold over the period
1980 -1995 where the number of skilled migrants from SSA were increasing but
very slowly. The second regime hold over the period 1995-2005 where the num-
ber of skilled migrants has been increasing at an increasing rate; and the third
regime hold over the period 2005-2010 where the number of skilled migrants has
stagnated. We might also see that the number of skilled migrants in the second
regime has been growing faster than the number of skilled residents.
Figure 1: Dynamic of skilled migration in SSA (1980-2010)
Source: Authors’ construction from BCM (2013)
Figure 2 strongly support the idea that brain drain is negatively corre-
lated to the country size in SSA. In addition, the idea that brain drain is negatively
correlated to the level of income is just partially admitted in SSA. In fact, out of
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Table 2: Dynamic of brain drain and structure of migrants in SSA 1980-2010
Brain drain 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
By country size
Large countries 13.21% 14.04% 14.16% 11.28% 12.05% 14.29% 15.26%
Medium countries 16.70% 17.68% 16.86% 15.04% 18.14% 20.98% 23.28%
Small countries 11.75% 11.91% 12.84% 18.12% 20.37% 21.12% 20.75%
Very small countries 16.61% 18.06% 21.36% 19.65% 19.78% 23.28% 25.18%
By income group
High income 53.42% 38.65% 68.90% 71.25% 61.55% 64.47% 62.58%
Upper Middle income 18.04% 14.87% 10.06% 6.47% 9.43% 11.60% 13.37%
Lower Middle income 12.14% 14.19% 14.79% 12.67% 14.47% 16.50% 16.60%
Low income 15.23% 15.83% 16.07% 14.51% 15.64% 18.22% 20.34%
By region
East Africa-SSA 17.0% 18.3% 19.4% 17.0% 19.2% 21.9% 23.5%
Western Africa-SSA 10.1% 11.1% 11.1% 10.1% 11.6% 13.8% 13.8%
Middle Africa-SSA 13.0% 14.2% 13.5% 13.2% 13.1% 14.3% 16.8%
Southern Africa-SSA 17.0% 14.2% 9.2% 5.3% 8.2% 10.2% 11.9%
Among migrants
By country size
Large countries 40.49% 47.37% 49.22% 46.59% 51.38% 56.80% 58.34%
Medium countries 26.48% 30.38% 33.55% 31.44% 34.86% 40.96% 40.30%
Small countries 42.06% 38.90% 40.85% 36.35% 38.93% 43.89% 45.29%
Very small countries 33.65% 32.21% 37.45% 33.16% 39.13% 45.04% 45.97%
By income group
High income 36.16% 24.43% 23.90% 30.40% 28.59% 34.27% 39.63%
Upper Middle income 37.22% 46.98% 55.01% 53.76% 60.02% 64.54% 67.18%
Lower Middle income 38.85% 47.37% 48.80% 45.92% 51.13% 55.85% 57.49%
Low income 33.86% 35.27% 37.40% 34.87% 38.15% 44.77% 44.92%
By region
Eastern Africa 34.50% 37.50% 39.40% 37.80% 42.10% 48.40% 50.40%
Western Africa 38.00% 46.40% 47.50% 44.10% 47.90% 53.70% 54.50%
Middle Africa 33.00% 33.00% 35.20% 32.30% 35.80% 41.80% 38.90%
Southern Africa 39.30% 46.10% 53.70% 51.10% 57.80% 60.80% 63.60%
Source: Authors’ calculation from Brucker, Capuano and Marfouk (2013)
***Note: Large countries (Population above 25 million), Medium countries
(population between 10 and 25 million), Small countries (Population between 2.5
and 10 million) and Very small countries (Population below 2.5 million). Among
migrants denotes the share of skilled migrants’ among total migrants’ population.
World bank classification of countries is the one used here.
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the 47 SSA countries considered, 4 countries (Cave Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles
and Equatorial Guinea) belongs to upper middle income and high or upper middle
income groups but exhibited extremely high brain drain (minimum of 50 percent).
On the other hand, we can simply explain this by the fact that all of them belong
to the group of small countries in terms of population size. For the remaining
countries of the sample, it appears clearly that brain drain is strongly negatively
correlated to the level of income.
Figure 2: Brain drain, income per capita and population size in 2010
Source Authors’ construction from BCM (2013)
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4 Evaluation of losses and gains from brain drain
There are several costs and benefits resulting from emigration and espe-
cially from skilled emigration that accrue to both host as well as source countries.
This section provides step by step the methodology of how losses and gains are
evaluated. in the losses side, we first consider the loss of the share of migrants
in the home production due to their departure (scenario 1); then after, we take
into account the effect their departure has on the productivity of those left behind
(Scenario 2) and finally, we account for education subsidies on skilled migrants
who got their education in the home country (Scenario 3). in the gain side, we
first evaluate remittances from skilled migrants, then we account for endogenized
education decision and finally, we account for diaspora externality.
4.1 Skilled emigration loss: labour demand- labour supply
framework
We are considering three scenario here: model without externalities, model
with externalities, model accounting for the cost of education of the migrant in
the source country.
4.1.1 Scenario 1: Loss from brain drain in absence of externalities
The simple economic model of labor demand and labor supply is an impor-
tant starting point to quantify the economic implication of brain drain under the
”certeris paribus” assumption. This framework has already been used in the liter-
ature (Borjas, 1995; Mishra, 2007). Economic measure used will be GDP accruing
to those who have stayed in the source country. Let us consider a CES production
function for a single good given as:
Yi = [piiKρi + (1− pii)Nρi ]1/ρ (1)
Where K is the fixed factor assumed to be internationally immobile, N is the
labor employed in the production and Y is the gross domestic product, pi measures
the preference for capital and ρ = (σ − 1)/σ, σ being the elasticity of substitution
between skilled labour and capital. The figure 4 below show our simple model.
Aggregate production function exhibit constant return to scale. As a
result, total output is divided into the workers and the capital owners. Prior the
emigration of M labors, the equilibrium required that each factor price equals the
respective value of marginal product. Figure 3 illustrated this initial equilibrium
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Figure 3: Labor demand-supply model economic impact of brain drain
Source: adapted from Borjas (1995)
in the labor market. Given that the supply of capital is considered inelastic, the
era under the marginal product of labor curve gives the economy’s total output
given by the era ACL0. When M workers leave for abroad, economy’s total output
is now given by the era ABN0. The emigration loss is then given by the era BCE15.
This era as a percent of production is obtained by the relation:
∆YN
Y
=
[
K
∂r
∂N
+ L
∂w
∂N
]
∆N
Y
(2)
Change in labor supply depicted in equation (2) is supposed to be only
due to emigration; otherwise, it represents the stock of emigrants. The equation
(3) below (See appendix 1 for detailed calculation) gives the expression of loss from
emigration under the scenario (1)
15This era represents the emigration loss for the source country which might also be expressed
as:
Era(BCE) =
1
2 (w1 − w0)×∆N
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ELi =
∆YN
Y
=
1
2
s(1− s)m2
σ
(3)
Where s stands share of labor in the national production, m the total emi-
gration rate and σ the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Since there is no externality here, the loss due to skilled emigration in country i
will just be given by:
(ELi)sc1 =
∆YN,i
Y
=
1
2
shi (1− shi )(mhi )2
σ
(4)
Where shi stands for the share of skilled labor in the national production
of country i; mhi for the fraction of skilled labor in country i that has emigrated
abroad and σ the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Losses from
brain drain will be evaluated under scenario 1 using equation (4)
4.1.2 Scenario 2: Loss from brain drain when account for externalities
Based on the argument that an increase in trade generates external returns
in the aggregate economy16, increase in emigration would reduce the size of the
market and then the external returns in the aggregate economy. It can drastically
reduce many interactions among workers and firms so that remaining workers and
firms might lose something. As a result, even though the production technology
at a firm level has constant return to scale, the externalities resulting from skilled
emigration might lead to decreasing returns on the aggregate output for the whole
economy. This hold under the argument that interactions between workers either
skilled or unskilled affect their productivity in such a way that when skilled emi-
gration occurs, the productivity of both skilled and unskilled workers left behind
reduces. Medical doctors, nurses, engineers, researchers are not only more produc-
tive themselves, but they are also expected to make other workers more productive
(Mishra, 2007). Borjas (1995) found that external effect might be substantial.
To represent those external effects, following Borjas (1995) and Mishra
(2007), as emigrant reduces the scale of the economy, the marginal product of both
labor and capital decreases. When ignoring capital, to illustrate how skilled com-
position of emigration affects emigration loss, we consider that there are only two
skill classes in the workforce: high skilled workers Nh and low skilled workers Nl.
Production function will be given by Y = F (Nh, Nl). If skilled labor is comple-
mentary to the other factors, then the production function of a representative firm
16See Helpman and Krugman (1985) for more details
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can be expressed as YF = f(nh, nh). Since external effects enters the production
function through skilled labor, our function might be expressed as:
YF = f(nh, nl)Nγh (5)
Where YF stands for the representative firm’s output,nh and nl are the high
skilled and low skilled labor employed by the representative firm. Nh stands for
the aggregate stock of high skilled labor employed in the economy and γ represents
the percentage change in marginal product of high and low skilled labor caused
by a 1 percent change in aggregate stock of high skilled labor. Figure 4 depicts
the emigration loss when external effects are taken into account. When M skilled
workers flight out of the economy, the supply curve of skilled workers moves to-
ward the left (contraction of N) from S to S ′; and the marginal product curve
of workers stayed behind also move toward the left (reduction) from MPLS to
MPL
′
S. Emigration loss is now given by the era of the trapezoid ABDF plus the
era of the triangle EBC (emigration loss = era ABDF + era EBC). It is easy to
see that the added era (era ABDF) is the emigration loss due to the presence of
external effect.
For analytical purposes, the new production function of the economy
taking into account external effect is given as:
Y = F (K,Nh, Nl)1/(1−γ) (6)
Applying equation (1), emigration loss in presence of external effect is given by
(see appendix 2 for calculation details):
(ELi)sc2 =
∆YN,i
Y
=
1
2
shi (1− shi )(mhi )2
σ
+
γ shi m
h
i
1− γ
(
1− shi mhi
)
+
γ slim
h
i
1− γ
(
1− slimhi
)
(7)
The first term of this expression is identical to equation (4). The second and
third terms of this expression denote the external effect of brain drain on skilled
and unskilled labor respectively as documented by Mishra (2007). In other words,
larger the external effects, greater the emigration loss. Losses from brain drain
will be evaluated under scenario 2 using (7)
4.1.3 Scenario 3:Loss from brain drain when account for the cost of
schooling in the home country
Since governments cover a portion of the cost of education of their citi-
zens in form of education subsidies (specially in the developing world), we include
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Figure 4: Labor demand-supply model: economic impact of brain drain with
external effect
Source: adapted from Borjas (1995)
government expenditure of highly educated individuals who migrate, if they got
their education in the home country. This include primary, secondary and tertiary
education expenditures of these migrants. The annual expenditure on education
of skilled migrant who leave the country EMh can be expressed as EMh = ChMh
where Mh is the number of high skilled migrants and Ch the cost supported by
the government in subsidizing the education of one skilled individual who migrate.
Ch =
T
Et
where T is the total annual expenditure on education (primary, secondary,
tertiary) and Et is the total annual school enrolment i.e
Ch =
p,s,t∑
j
(Tj/Ej)
Then, the public loss is then given by:
SLi = Chi snδMhi (8)
WhereSLi stands for subsidy loss in country i, n stands for the average number of
years spent in schooling in the home country and δ is the share of migrants that
has taken its education at home. Total skilled emigration loss is now obtained by
combining equations (7) and (8).
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(ELi)sc3 =
∆YN,i
Y
=
1
2
shi (1− shi )(mhi )2
σ
+
γ shi m
h
i
1− γ
(
1− shi mhi
)
+
γ slim
h
i
1− γ
(
1− slimhi
)
+cihnδ
Mhi
Yi
(9)
Equation (9) gives us the complete function of brain loss that will be esti-
mated. Losses from brain drain will be evaluated under scenario 3 using equation
(9).
Once, this loss function is estimated, we then convert it into a per capita income
loss. From equation (9), the per capita loss is given by:
∆YN,i
Pi
=
[
1
2
shi (1− shi )(mhi )2
σ
+
γ shi m
h
i
1− γ
(
1− shi mhi
)
+
γ slim
h
i
1− γ
(
1− slimhi
)
+ cihnδ
Mhi
Yi
]
Yi
Pi
Where P stands for the population. In a more simpler form, it gives:
∆yi =
[
1
2
shi (1− shi )(mhi )2
σ
+
γ shi m
h
i
1− γ
(
1− shi mhi
)
+
γ slim
h
i
1− γ
(
1− slimhi
)]
yi+cihnδ
Mhi
Pi
From this expression, we can easily derive that:
∆yi/yi = ∆yi/ (yi + ∆yi) (10)
The per capita income loss due to brain drain will finally be obtain using
equation (10).
4.2 Skilled emigration gain: Development accounting model
As documented by the literature on migration, brain drain and develope-
ment, the main gains are remittances, endogenous education decisions and diaspora
externalities (Docquier, 2017; Rapoport, 2010; Docquier et Rapoport, 2012; Beine
et al, 2008; Mishra, 2007). The last two components of emigration gain are pre-
sented following the approach adopted by Docquier (2017) under the development
accounting framework that we quickly summarize. Globally, brain gain is obtain
in three step. At the first step, we evaluate remittances from skilled migrants.
At the second step, we evaluate gain from endogenizing education decision and
then, add it to remittances. At the third step, we evaluate gain from diaspora
externality and then add it to remittances and endogenized education decision.
4.2.1 Development accounting framework
As highlited by Jones (2014), Hendricks and Schoelleman (2016), the goal of
development accounting model is to decompose variation in output into variation
26
in three components: capital labor ratio, total factor productivity and human
capital. So, let us consider a simple Cobb-Douglas production function given by:
Yi = F (Ai, Ki, Hi) = AiKαi H1−αi
where Y stands for total output, A: total factor productivity, K: total stock of
physical capital and H: the aggregate human capital stock. α is the share of cap-
ital in total output and (1 − α) is the share of aggregate human capital in total
output. Moreover, Hi = hiLi where h is the human capital per worker and L the
number of workers.
In the intensive form, the above production function will be given by
yi = Aikαi h1−αi
In line with Jones (2014), let us desaggregate the human capital into two
components, high and low skilled respectively:
hi = G
(
hLi , (1− hLi )
)
where hLi denotes high skilled human capital and (1 − hLi ) denotes low skilled
human capital.
Under the hypothesis of perfect substitution within each skill group and
imperfect substitution between the two skill groups, we consider human capital
being a constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Our intensive form of per capita
income becomes:
yi = Aikαi
θi(hLi )
(σL − 1)
σL + (1− θi) (1− hLi )
(σL − 1)
σL

σL(1−α)/(σL−1)
Where hL is the proportion of the resident skilled labor force,Ai the level
of total factor productivity, θi the relative productivity parameters capturing the
skilled biased in production.
Labor market and growth literature provides evidence that, in an openned
economy, capital adjustment are quite rapid such that in presence of migration,
since it affects one for one employment and capital stock, capital-labour ratio re-
mains almost unchanged (Ortega and Peri, 2009; Kennan, 2013). In addition, this
literature also supports the idea that C.E.S production explain well the disparity
in macroeconomic performance between countries as well as the pattern of wage
inequality accross skill groups, and then providing an additional reason for its use.
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So, since we are investigating how per capita income changes because of a change
in human capital accumulation and total factor productivity, capital-labour ratio
is removed from the above function and it becomes:
y(hLi ) = Ai
θi(hLi )
σL − 1
σL + (1− θi) (1− hLi )
σL − 1
σL

σL/(σL−1)
(11)
Where A stands for total factor productivity (TFP). The share of skilled
labour force among resident labour force is
hLi =
hNi (1−mhi )
hNi (1−mhi ) + (1− hNi )(1−mli)
In this expression, hL, mh and ml are oberved. So, the only unobservable
component is hN which stand for the counter-factual level of hL in absence of brain
drain.
4.2.2 Brain gain as remittances
As argued by Grubel and Scott (1966), migration in general and skilled
migration specifically normally raises long term average income of those left behing
in home country, due to an increase in the country’s capital-labor ratio through
remittances. Nowadays, official remittances on average represented 2.4% of SSA
GDP in 2010 (World Bank, 2016). So, emigration gain as remittances expressed
in per capita term is given by:
Rp,i =
REMi
Pi
(12)
where REMi stands for aggregate volume of remittances received by SSA coun-
try i. Since skilled migrants are more likely to remit less at least in SSA
(See Appendix 4); due to the absence of recorded statistics on remittances made
by skilled emigrants, we can formulate the hypothesis that remittances from
skilled migrants are proportional to the share of skilled in the popu-
lation of migrants17. This hypothesis is over-optimal because results suggests
that their remittances should be less than proportional to their share knowing that
they remit less.
This hypothesis allows us to estimate the share of remittances which comes from
17This hyppothesis is rather too optimistic in our view regarding their lower propensity to
remit
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skilled migrants.
If ψhi stands for the share of skilled among migrants for a given country i, Mhi
and M li the number of skilled and unskilled migrants respectively from country i,
ψhi =
Mhi
M li +Mhi
and remittances from skilled migrant is given by: Rhp,i = ψhi Rp,i. Emigration gain
becomes:
EG(1) = ψhi
Rp,i
y(hLi )
(13)
4.2.3 Contribution of the endogenization of education decisions and
diaspora externalities: counterfactual analysis
In this framework, the rise in human capital mechanically increases the in-
come since skilled workers are more productive than unskilled. Per capita income
and skilled specific wage ratio are given by:
y(hLi ) = Ai
[
θi(hLi )
σL−1
σL + (1− θi) (1− hLi )
σL−1
σL
] σL
σL−1 (14)
With the specific skill wage ratio expressed as:
whi
wli
= θi1− θi
(
hLi
1− hLi
)−1
σL
(15)
Where hLi 18 stands for the share of skilled labor force in the resident labor force.
The counterfactual per capita income is given by:
y(hNi ) = Ai
θi(hNi )
σL − 1
σL + (1− θi) (1− hNi )
σL − 1
σL

σL
σL − 1
(16)
Once counterfactual per capita income is determined, we can now com-
pute the effect of skilled emigration on per capita income as a percentage of its
18hLi is obtained from the expression hLi =
hNi (1−mhi )
hNi (1−mhi ) + (1− hNi )(1−mli)
. More-
over, the counterfactual level of h in absence of migration is also expressed as: hNi =
hLi (1−mli)
1−mhi + hLi (mhi −mli)
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no-emigration level. This is expressed by:
∆i =
y(hLi )− y(hNi )
y(hNi )
(17)
4.2.4 Gain from brain drain when account for endogenizing education
decisions
Following Beine et al (2008a)19 who demonstrated that by doubling the
size of brain drain in a country, its stock of human capital will increase by 5% in
a post migration setting, we assume that hNi depends on skill-biased emigration
prospects20 and elasticity of hNi to skill-biased migration prospects then equal to
5% (0.05). We are going to evaluate a new counterfactual level of human capital
under that setting. The new counterfactual (i.e the human capital accumulation
in absence of brain drain) is expressed as:
hNcf,i =
hN
[mhi /mli]eh
(18)
Where eh stands for elasticity of hNi to skilled biased migration prospects.
We will then use the result of equation (18) to estimate the counterfactual
per capita income. So, the gain from endogenizing education decision is given by
∆eedi and obtained by applying equation(17) in which hNi is replaced by hNcf,i.Total
gain from brain drain will then be given by:
EG (2) = ψhi
RPi
y(hLi )
+ ∆eedi (19)
4.2.5 Brain gain as remittances, endogenization of education decisions
and diaspora externalities
Diaspora networks can help source countries to integrate more into the
global economy through their contribution to bilateral trade, foreign directs in-
vestments and other financial flows. Moreover, they contribute to the diffusion
of knowledge and technology between host and source country (Rapoport, 2018;
Lodigiani, 2009; Docquier et Rapoport, 2012). Using the framework provided by
Doquier (2017), diaspora externalities are integrated into the model through the
total factor productivity (TFP). Thus, the new expression of TFP is given by:
Ai = A0i
(
hLi
1− hLi
)
(1 + ρmi) (20)
19Also followed by Docquier (2017).
20mhi /m
l
i
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From (20), elasticity of TFP with respect to emigration 21 is expressed as:
ede =
ρmi
1 + ρmi
(21)
We then use this new Ai to calculate ycfi . Thereafter, we use it to calculate the
new counterfactual per capita income which finally allow to evaluate change in per
capita income due to brain drain now given by ∆dei . Total gain from brain drain
when account for diaspora externalities is:
EG (3) = EG (Total) = ψki
RPi
y(hLi )
+ ∆eedi + ∆dei (22)
Once this is done, since we have now identified negatives consequences
and positives consequences from brain drain, we will just have to determine the net
effect by doing the difference between equation (??) and equation (7). Equation
(22) provides the total gain from skilled emigration.
5 Parameters calibration
We start by providing a summary of the main parameters calibrated and then
after, we show how they have been calibrated.
5.1 Share of skilled workers educated in SSA (δ).
In line with Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006), immigrants’ age of entry
is used as proxy for where they acquired their education. Those authors estimated
that among immigrants aged 25 or more and working in OECD countries with
tertiary education, 85.7% arrived after age 12, 78.2% after age 18 and 69.1% after
age 22. So, we consider 69.1% as share of skilled emigrants from SSA to OECD
countries who acquired their education at home and thus has beneficted from gov-
ernment education subsidy (δ = 0.691).
5.2 Skilled labour share in national income (shi )
Authors such as Guriero and Sen (2012) and Gueriero (2019) have estimated
the labour share in national income for a set of countries over the period 1970-
21ede =
∂Ai
∂mi
× mi
Ai
= ρA0i
(
hLi
1− hLi
)
× mi
Ai = A0i
(
hLi
1− hLi
)
(1 + ρmi)
=
ρmi
1 + ρmi
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Table 3: summary of parameters calibrated
Parameter parameter value Objective
Share of migrants educated δ = 0.691 For evaluation of
in the home country (δ) education subsidies loss
Skilled labour share (sh) Mean= 0.35 Skilled
Min =0.14 ; Max=0.53 emigration loss
Elasticity of substitution Mean = 0.32 Skilled
between K & L (σ) Min =0.17 ; Max = 0.71 emigration loss
Elasticity of substitution Allows to evaluate
between H & L skilled (σL) σL = 2 the counterfactual y
Yearly per capita Mean = 576$ education
subsidy in education (Ch) Min =22$; Max = 4787.3$ subsidy loss
Evaluate how brain drain
External effect (γ) γ = 0.1 affect the prodctivity
of those left behind
Wage ratio (wH/wL) Mean = 5.9 Allow to evaluate
Min =2.96 ; Max=13.99 preference for skilled
Relative productivity (θ) Mean = 0.342 Allow to evaluate
Min=0.203 ; Max=0.435 the counterfactual y
Share of skilled Mean = 0.364 For evaluation of remittances
among migrants(ψh) Min=0.045 ; Max=0.714 from skilled migrants
Technological externality ()  = 0.2 Aggregate TFP externality
Skilled biaised externality (κ) κ = 0.1 Directed technical changes
Diaspora externality (ρ) ρ = 0.618 Diaspora externality gain
2006 for the first and 1970-2015 for the second. Their studies provide estimates
for 33 SSA countries. In order to have data for the remaining 14 countries, we
use average labour share of income group in which they belong (low income, lower
middle income and upper middle income). Thereafter, we derive the skilled labour
share. In line with Mishra (2007), we consider that highly educated belong to the
top 20% of the income earners22. Finally, by just multiplying total labour share
in national income and the average income share of the top 20%, we obtain the
skilled labour share in national income.
22data on top 20% of income earners are from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Moreover, for countries like Somalia, Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea for which data are not
available, we use the average income share of the top 20% estimated by Dollar and Kray (2002,
2014) which is about 40%
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5.3 Elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled
labour and between high and low skilled labour
Following Borjas (1995) and Faini (2007), the elasticity of factor price of
skilled labour (ehi )23 is given by ehi =
1− shi
σ
; where σ is the elastcity of substitu-
tion between skilled labour and capital. When production function is CES, ehi = 1,
then it is easy to derive that σ = 1− shi .
In line with labour market literature (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), the elas-
ticity of substitution (σL) between skilled and unskilled workers varies between 1.5
and 3. As Docquier(2017), we choose the average which is about 2 (σL = 2).
5.4 Yearly per capita public subsidy on education (Ch)
The annual expenditure on education of skilled migrant who leave the coun-
try EMh can be expressed as EMh = CsMh where Mh is the number of high skilled
migrants and Cs the cost supported by the government in subsidizing the educa-
tion of one skilled individual who migrate. Cs =
T
Et
where T is the total annual
expenditure on education (primary, secondary, tertiary) and Et is the total annual
school enrolment i.e cs =
Tpr
Epr
+ Tse
Ese
+ Tte
Ete
.
5.5 External effect (γ)
External effect of skilled emigration captures the percentage change in the marginal
product of skilled and unskilled workers due to 1% change in aggregate stock of
skilled labour. In line with Borjas (1995) and Mishra (2007), we choose γ = 0.1.
5.6 Wage ratio, relative productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity
In order to be able to calculate our counterfactual per capita income, we
have to calibrate θi and Ai such that they perfectly match with observed per capita
income y(hLi ). Equation (15) will allow to calibrate θi once the value of skill specific
23Percentage change in the wage with respect of 1% change in the size of labour force
33
wage ratio is known.
The estimation of the skill specific wage ratio follows the approach adopted
by Delogu, Docquier and Machado (2018). In fact, this ratio is proxied by
whi
wli
= (1 + MRi)∆Y Ei
Where MRi is the Mincerian returns to schooling in country i (Hendricks,2004)and
∆Y Ei is the difference in year of schooling between skilled and unskilled (Barro
and Lee, 2013). For countries for which data are not available, we predict the
wage ratio using a log linear function of the skill ratio in the resident labour
force estimated by Delogu et al (2018).24. Preference for skilled workers θi is then
calibrated to match the wage ratio. Equation (14) can be rewrite as: yi = Aiqi
where
qi =
[
θi(hLi )
σL−1
σL + (1− θi)(1− hLi )
σL−1
σL
] σL
σL−1
.
This allow to use labor composite of per capita income qi and observed per
capita income yi to retrieve the country specific productivity level expressed as
Ai = yi/qi.
5.7 Technological, skilled biased and diaspora externalities
As Docquier (2017), we consider technological externality  as being equal
to 0.2 i.e  = 0.2 and skilled biased externality κ as being equal to 0.1 i.e κ = 0.1.
A wide range of literature25 has identified on the one side a causal rela-
tionship from migration to trade and foreign direct investment (with respective
elasticities of 0.1 and 0.2) and on the other side, a causal relationship from trade
and foreign direct investment to total factor productivity (with respective prob-
ability of 0.3 and 0.01). By combining these findings, Docquier (2017) obtain an
elasticity of total factor productivity to emigration of 0.03 (ede = 0.03). From
equation(21), we easily obtain the diaspora externality which amount 0.618 (i.e
ρ = 0.618).
24ln
(
whi
wli
)
= 0.25− 0.31 ln
(
hLi
1− hLi
)
with R2 = 0.57
25See Docquier (2017), pp 64 for details
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Figure 5: Average characteristics by development level in 2010
Note: These average characteristics are obtained by simple average for the whole
sample in 2010. And 2010 is chosen because it is the most recent period in this
study.
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6 Results
In this section, we present results on losses, gains and finally net effect in
SSA both at the global level, regional level and then country level. There after,
we present the evolution of net effect over time
6.1 Broad picture in 2010
For a simple understanding, we present here only the situation of 2010 which
is the most recent period in our study.
6.1.1 Average situation for the whole SSA in 2010
From considering the case of 2010, the pattern depicted in figure 6 below
shows that on average, under the scenario 1 (absence of externality and education
subsidy), for SSA countries with per capita income around 800$, income loss due to
brain drain amount 3% of the counterfactual no migration level. This income loss
amounts 2% for countries around 1700$ and reach 4% for countries above 5000$.
When taking into account externality, (scenario 2), the income loss increases sub-
stantially and reach almost 5.2% for countries arount 800$; 4% for countries around
1700$ and 7% for countries above 5000$. Under the third scenario, income loss
increases up to 5.5% for the first group, 4.2% for the second group and 8% for
the third group. These findings suggest in overall that on average in SSA, low
income countries and upper middle income countries experience important losses
from brain drain with upper middle income countries being the most affected while
losses in lower middle income countries are rather limited. Moreover, the presence
of externality increases substantially the income loss due to brain drain in SSA
(from 3% to 5% for the first group, 2% to 4% for the second group and from 4%
to 6% for the last.) while income loss due to education subsidies is rather limited
(less than 1%) except for countries with per capita income above 5000$ whose
income loss increases by 2% due to government spending on education.
When analysing this average situation in 2010 with respect to the size of
brain drain, pattern depicted in figure 6.b above shows that, in absence of exter-
nality and education subsidies, countries with brain drain less than 12% exhibit
an income loss of 1%, those with brain drain between 12% and 18% exhibit an
income loss of 2%. And then, 3% and 7% respectively for countries with brain
drain between 18% and 25% and above 25%. (Green - dash curve). In presence
of externality but without education subsidies (blue curve with long dash), we
observe an income loss of 2%, 3%, 5% and 11% respectively for the four groups.
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Figure 6: Loss from brain drain by income level and brain drain size in 2010
In presence of education subsidies, the situation remain almost unchanged for the
first group while the remaining groups exhibit 4%, 6% and 12% of income loss
respectively. In overall, income loss increases with the size of skilled emigration
ranging from 1% for countries with low brain drain to 7% for countries with high
brain drain. Futhermore, externality strongly increases the income loss for all the
brain drain size with countries with brain drain above 25% being the most affected.
The picture does not change that much when education subsidies are taken into
account except for countries with high brain drain.
The situation we have just presented hide a lot of specificities given that it
has just presented average figures. The next point will present insights at coun-
try’s level.
6.1.2 Countries and regions specific picture
Figure (7) depicts skilled emigration loss for each SSA country. The pattern
strongly support the idea that per capita income loss from brain drain is positively
associated to the size of the brain drain with a R2 of 96.2% meaning that loss from
brain brain increases as size of brain drain comes bigger and bigger. In addition,
53.2% of SSA countries exhibit an income loss less than 5% while 23.4% exhibit an
income loss between 5% and 10% of counter-factual per capita income, and 23.4%
exhibit an income loss above 10%. It is also important to highlight the fact that
4 countries experience very important income loss: Mautritius (15%), Seychelles
(16%), Cape Verde (20%) and Sao Tome (22%).
At regional26 level, figure 8 shows that, in Middle, Western and Southern
26Middle Africa, Western Africa, Southern Africa and Eastern Africa
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Figure 7: Skilled emigration loss by country in 2010
Africa, more than 50% of the countries (25 countries) exhibit relatively small loss
(less than 5%) from brain drain (55.6%, 68.7% and 83% respectively). However, in
Eastern Africa, 62% of countries experience important loss (more than 5%) from
brain drain. Moreover, among the 10 SSA countries with skilled emigration loss
above 10%, 6 are from Eastern Africa (Erithrea, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique,
Mauritius and Seychelles).
6.2 Skilled emigration gain in 2010
6.2.1 Average situation for the whole SSA in 2010
Figure 9.a shows that brain gain is on average negatively correlated to the
level of per capita income (R2 = 26.2%) as well as negatively correlated to the size
of brain drain (R2 = 38.5%). When only remittances (blue-long dash curve) are
taken into account, that gain amounts 1% for countries with per capita income
around 800$, 2% for countries around 1000$, 1% for countries around 1700$ and
almost 0% for countries above 5000$. When we only consider gain from dias-
pora externality, situation remains almost unchanged except for countries above
5000$ where this gain amount on average 5% of per capita income. Moreover,
diaspora externality increases with the level of development (black-dash curve)
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Figure 8: Regional distribution of skilled emigration Loss in SSA in 2010
Figure 9: Average gain by level of developement and size of brain drain in 2010
while per capita remittances exhibit an inverted U-Shape pattern with countries
around 1200$ experiencing the higest per capita benefit. When we individually
consider gain from endogenized education decision (Orange-long dash), we do ob-
serve that, compared to the two other categories of gain (remittances and diaspora
externality), this category of gain is the most important especially for countries
with per capita income below 5000$. In fact, we can see that countries with per
capita income around 800$ have a gain which amount 7% eventually because of
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their low level of initial human capital as well as the schooling incentive created by
the future migration prospect. Countries around 1200$ and 1700$ exhibit about
4% gains while countries above 5000$ exhibit negative education incentives. This
observation suggests that gains from endogenized education are very important in
low income countries and but vanish progressively as countries become richer. On
average, for upper middle income countries, this gain is very limited and becomes
even negative. The structure of the three categories of brain gain as well as the
pattern of the overall brain gain (black-bolt curve) is driven by endogenized edu-
cation decisions.
When we consider the size of brain drain, the structure of diffents category
of gains remain almost identical (increasing pattern for diaspora externality, in-
verted U-shape for remittances and decreasing pattern for endogenized education
decision). As depicted in figure 9.b, brain gain is on an increasing pattern (with
an income gain up to 10% in average) for countries exhibiting around 12% brain
drain while it is decreasing for countries between 12% and 25% (with an income
gain of 8% around 18% BD and 4% around 25% BD on average) while remaining
constant at 4% for countries with more than 25% BD.
This picture we have just presented is just the average picture and thus, hide
a lot of specificities at country level. The next section will provide the situation
of differents countries regions of SSA in order to charaterize the structure of brain
gain.
6.2.2 Countries and regions specific picture
Our results show (See Figure 10) that brain gain is negatively correlated to
the size of brain drain (R2 = 19.4%). Moreover, even in the gain side, 21.3% of
SSA countries27 exhibit negative gains driven by education desincentives. Those
desincentives cost between 1% and 5% of per capita income except for Seychelles
whose this cost amount up to 8% of per capita income. It then becomes easy
to derive that those countries will be big losers in net terms. Among those 10
countries, 9 experience a brain drain above 25%.
Among the 37 countries experiencing a gain, Lesotho exhibit very high
gain (29%) compared to the rest of the region. This gain is mainly driven by
remittances28 which represent 52% of that income gain (15% of per capita income).
Overall, income gain is between 0.9% and 10% for 25 countries, between
10% and 15% for seven countries and above 15% for six countries. In addition,
27Gabon, Kenya, Angola, Erithrea, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Seychelles and Sao
Tome
28As percent of GDP, in 2009 Lostho was the third largest remittances recipient in the world
(24.8%) just behind Tajikistan (35.1%) and Tonga(27.7%)
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the pattern is more or less flat for size of brain drain below 20% and thereafter
becomes negative when brain drain exceed 20%.
Figure 10: Skilled emigration gain by country in 2010
At sub-regional level, while brain gain exhibits an inverted U-shape pat-
tern in Eastern Africa (R2 = 68%), it decreases with the size of brain drain in
Western Africa (R2 = 51%), in Middle Africa (R2 = 48%) and in Southern Africa
(R2 = 34%). In Eastern Africa, for countries with brain drain below 20%, brain
gain exhibits a decreasing pattern, which becomes increasing for countries with
brain drain between 20% and 35%; and then becomes decreasing for countries
with brain drain above 60%. In Western Africa, the pattern of brain gain is de-
creasing with the size of brain drain. Countries exhibiting more than 10% income
gain are those with brain drain below 10%; this income gain falls in the interval
[5% - 10%] with brain drain between 10% and 25%. This income gain moves into
income loss for countries with brain drain above 25%. In Southern Africa, income
gain is substantial (more than 10%) for the majority of this sub-region. In Middle
Africa, income gain is rather moderate (less than 4% for 77.8% of the sub-region’s
countries). We also observe countries with negative gain which mainly exhibit
brain drain above 50%.
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Figure 11: Distribution of brain gain by region in 2010
6.3 Net effect: Net Brain Gain versus Net Brain Loss
6.3.1 Picture of 2010 at global, regional and country’s level
As depicted in figure 12, countries expriencing a brain drain lower than
25% are on average net winners. The pattern of net income response to brain
drain is flat for brain drain lower than 12%29. Above 12%, net income response
decreases with the level of brain drain. With brain drain above 25%, the net
income response is negative meaning that SSA countries above that level are, on
average, net losers30.
With respects to country specifics net effects (see figure 12), our finding
show that in 2010, net income response to brain drain is negatively correlated to
size of brain drain (R2 = 64%). Moreover, they show that 20 out of 47 countries
in SSA are net losers. 40% of those losers exhibit an income loss greater than
10% and 75% among them experience a brain drain higher than 25% and they are
mainly small countries31. Among the 60% of winners, about 2/3 of them experi-
ence a relatively low brain drain (below 15%).
At subregional level (see figure 14), we do observe that in Eastern Africa,almost
29below 12% of brain drain, net per capita income gain is on average 8%
30Average net loss rich 8% of per capita income
31Eritrea, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Sao
Tome and Principe
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Figure 12: Country net effect of brain drain in 2010
50% of countries are losers. In addition, the pattern of net income response shows
that there are at least two interval of brain drain compatible with a net income
gain. In fact, in the interval [0% - 18%] and [24% - 40%] of brain drain, countries
in Eastern Africa are net winners while in the interval ]18% - 25%] and above 40%
of brain drain, Eastern African countries are net losers.
In Western Africa, net income response is negatively associated to the size
of brain drain (R2 = 67, 9%). Almost 40% of countries in this area are net losers
against 60% of net winners. Among winners, 70% experience substantial income
gain above 5%. Net losers mainly experience a brain drain greater than 20%.
In Middle Africa, net income response to BD decreases with it size
(R2 = 82.2%) and there are more losers than winners (6 countries out of the
9 in this subregion). 67% of countries in this area are net losers and net losses
are substantial for some of them such as Sao Tome (25% of per capita income)
and Equatorial Guinea (15% of per capita income). More over,Gabon with its low
brain drain exhibits net income loss of about 5% which is rather a curiousity.
In Southern Africa, the pattern of net income response to brain drain is
rather hard to identified because, if Swaziland is excluded of the sample, then the
net income response is positively associated to brain drain while by integrating
Swaziland, the reverse hold. But Swaziland is rather an outlier in this subregion.
all the countries are net winners except Swaziland which exhibits a moderate loss
(4%) with a high brain drain (29%). Moreover, this subregion is the only one
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Figure 13: Regional distribution of Net income response to BD in 2010
which has observed a decline in brain drain over time and the only loser is a small
country compared to a large country such as South Africa which is a big winner
and at the same time account for more than 85% of the Southern Africa population.
6.3.2 Net effect of brain drain over time (1980 - 2010)
So far, we have focused on the year 2010 in order to dissect the structure of
losses and gains from BD in SSA both at national and regional level. But, results
show that net effect change over time. It appears that SSA as a whole is a net
winner both with simple and weighted32 average all over the period covered by this
study. However, these net gains exhibit a decreasing pattern (table 3). Moreover,
there is an increasing number of losers and a decreasing number of winners as a
mechanical consequence (figure 14.f).
It is straight forward to understand that the difference in net positive income
response between weighted and simple average is mainly driven by large countries33
32Weighted by the size of the population for each country
33D.R. Congo(6.91%), Ethiopia(10.12%), Nigeria(19,2%), South Africa(8%) and Tanzania
(5%)
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which are net winners and represent almost the half of the Sub Saharan African
population (49.2%). At regional level, if each country is considerd as an equal
unit, then, Middle Africa (MA) and Eastern Africa (EA) do not only observe a
strong decline in their net income gain from brain drain, but they end up net losers
from 2005 for MA and in 2010 for EA. The picture is slightly different with income
gains weighted by population size because in these two areas, large countries are
pulling the net effect upward. If we now turn to weighted average only, MA, EA
and WA observe a strong decline in their net income gain from BD while for SA it
is relatively flat. In addition, net income response in WA and EA are very close to
the SSA level to some extend because they cover almost 70% of SSA population. It
also apears that MA is far below the SSA level in non weighted average and above
the SSA level in weighted average because it contents some small countries which
are among big losers (Sao Tome, Equatorial Guinea with losses between 15% and
25% of their per capita income and at the same time represent only 0.65% of the
MA population while only DRC which is the biggest winner in 2010 in this region
alone accounts for 49% of the total population). SA which experienced the highest
net income gain is the less affected area in SSA by BD; futhermore, results remain
almost unchanged in SA between weighted and non weighted average because they
are almost completely driven by South Africa which account for 87% of the SA
population.
Regarding income group, big winners are countries with per capita income
below 700$, followed by countries between 1500$ and 3000$. Countries with per
capita income above 3000$ were globally net losers from 1990 with countries be-
longing to the income group above 6000$ experiencing the highest loss which has
reached 6.5% in 2010. But, the structure of net income response has remained
identical overtime. We have first observed a U-Shaped for countries below 2000$
(net gains were decreasing with countries below 800$, stable for countries between
800% and 1200% and then increasing) and then an inverted U-Shaped for coun-
tries between 1200$ and 5000$ (plot b. of figure 14). This plot also depicts that
countries around 5000$ and more are likely to be net losers especially since 1990.
With respect to country size, pretty small countries (1.5 million< POP <
2.5 million) are big winners in SSA followed by small (2.5 million < POP < 10
million) and large countries (POP > 25 million) and this hold over the entire
period covered. But, gains in large countries have been less volatile compared to
the other winners. Very small countries (POP < 1.5 million) are the main losers
with losses which have reached 10.1% in 2010 against 2% in 1985. Globally, except
countries with population less than 1.5 million, net gains seem in average to move
in opposite direction with the population size. Thus, albeit large countries are
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winners, their net gains are lower than that of small and pretty small countries
With respect to the size of BD, countries experiencing low BD are big win-
ners while countries experiencing high brain drain are losers. More practically,
for countries with BD less than 5% net gains stand on average around 7% and
remains more or less the same up to 13% BD, and then, net gains start decreasing
up to 0% for BD size around 20% to 25%. This pattern is common to all the
period covered, and the threshold (size of BD which generates neither gain nor
loss) decreases from period to period (see plot c. of figure 14).
This threshold is structurally explained by the increasing pattern of losses
from BD and the decreasing pattern of gains associated. So, when losses equalize
the gains, this threshold is reached (plot b. of figure 14).
To synthesize, six importants obervations are drawn from these results. First,
over the period 1980 - 2010, the number of losers has been increasing (from 04 coun-
tries in 1980 to 20 countries in 2010 out of the 47 considered) with the natural
consequence of proportional decline in the number of winners (from 43 countries
in 1980 to 27 in 2010) as depicted in figure 14.d. This might to some extend be
explained by the important increase in the size of BD overtime. Second, some
former winners have became losers with time but there are only three34 countries
which have been able to move sporadically from losers to winners showing thus
the persistence of loss when it occurs (see appendix 6). Third, top winners35 have
experienced important decline in their net gain from BD (figure 14.c).Fourth, in
SSA, the threshold size of brain drain above which a country is likely to experience
net loss has been changing overtime36.
Fifth, on the one side, large countries are net winners over time ex-
cept Kenya which has been losing since 1990. On the other side, big losers are
mainly small countries below 10 million inhabitants; but still, some relatively large
countries are also losing (Somalia, Kenya, Angola). Sixth, it seems difficult to ap-
preciate the pattern on net income response to BD in SSA with respect to the level
of development (per capita income). As Appendix 5 shows, from 1990 to 2010,
for the same level of per capita income, some countries are losers and some others
are winners. This make a relevant conclusion difficult despite the observed weakly
decreasing pattern.
34Liberia, Mozambique and Swaziland
35i.e winners with per capita income gain above 20% in 1980
3653% in 1980, 24% in 1990, 21% in 2000 and 22% in 2010
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Table 4: Regional distribution of net income response to brain drain [1980 - 2010]
Weighted average 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Sub-Saharan Africa 15.6% 12.5% 10.1% 8.4% 6.6% 5.7% 4.6%
Eastern Africa 14.6% 11.5% 9.7% 7.9% 5.9% 4.2% 2.8%
Middle Africa 17.8% 13.4% 10.8% 8.7% 8.3% 8.1% 7.1%
Southern Africa 21.2% 21.7% 15.4% 13.9% 13.2% 16.5% 15.8%
Western Africa 14.7% 11.1% 8.9% 7.6% 5.2% 4.2% 3.5%
Simple average
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.8% 9.2% 7.1% 5.0% 3.76% 3.1% 1.2%
Eastern Africa 12.5% 10.2% 7.2% 4.5% 2.7% 0.4% -0.6%
Middle Africa 9.1% 4.3% 3.5% 1.6% 0.4% -1.1% -1.7%
Southern Africa 20.8% 15.1% 11.3% 10.7% 11.4% 19.5% 11.0%
Western Africa 12.7% 9.1% 7.8% 5.0% 3.4% 2.0% 0.8%
By Income group
Below 700% 19.7% 16.4% 14.9% 10.4% 9.4% 7.2% 6.2%
700$ to 1000$ 15.2% 10.7% 8.8% 8.1% 5.3% 3.6% 2.2%
1000$ to 1500$ 12.7% 9.9% 8.7% 6.6% 5.2% 4.0% 2.7%
1500$ to 3000$ 17.0% 13.7% 10.8% 9.3% 7.5% 7.0% 6.2%
3000$ to 6000$ 4.4% 0.2% 0.5% -1.1% -2.8% -2.9% -4.3%
Above 6000$ 7.3% 1.0% -2.2% -2.8% -2.8% -5.8% -6.5%
By Country size
Large countries 15.6% 13.2% 10.1% 8.6% 7.2% 6.6% 6.1%
Medium countries 14.4% 10.4% 9.2% 7.8% 5.3% 4.0% 2.1%
Small countries 20.4% 16.6% 15.0% 10.4% 7.4% 5.9% 4.3%
Pretty small countries 21.7% 15.2% 12.3% 9.6% 9.3% 9.2% 7.7%
Very small countries 1.9% -2.0% -5.3% -5.6% -5.3% -3.0% -10.1%
By size of BD
Low (BD < 10%) 20.7% 16.8% 15.3% 12.0% 10.3% 9.9% 8.0%
Medium (10% < BD < 20%) 17.6% 15.1% 12.8% 10.8% 9.2% 8.4% 7.6%
High (20% < BD < 30%) 12.5% 7.0% 3.8% 1.9% 1.3% 5.2% -1.1%
Very High (BD > 30%) 3.5% 0.1% -1.4% -4.0% -5.3% -8.5% -8.9%
Note: Regarding country size, Large, Medium, Small, Pretty Small and Very
Small stand for countries with more than 25 million, between 10 and 25 million,
2.5 and 10 million, 1.5 and 2.5 million and less than 1.5 million inhabitants
respectively. In addition, regarding the distribution of net income response by
income group, I have excluded South Africa in group of country with percapita
income above 6000% because it represented alone more than 90% of the total
population of the group; risk being that by integrating it, we could obtain the South
Africa picture rather than the picture of countries belonging to that income group
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Figure 14: Distribution of net income response to brain drain
a. Net income response by country size b. Net income response by income group
c. Net income response by size of brain drain d. Structural formation of threshold size of brain drain 
e. Net income response by region f. Dynamic of winners and losers
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Note: In plot d, the exact pattern depicted by data for Brain Loss (BL) and Brain
Gain(BG) are those in long dash curves, with BL in purple and BG in green. The two
black curves denote the trend lines extimated using a polynomial function (because
exact trends have generated three intersections) and which match correctly with
observed BG (R2 = 0.64) and almost perfectly with observed BL (R2 = 0.90). Plot f,
depicts the evolution overtime of the number of net losers with dash curve in red and
the number of winners in dash curve in black.
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7 Concluding remarks
This study investigates whether positives consequences of skilled emigration
fully compensate its negative consequences in SSA over the period 1980 -2010. We
have derived a skilled emigration loss function from the labour demand - labour
supply model and a skilled emigration gain function from the developement ac-
counting model. Our model revealed on the one hand that mechanical loss due to
outflow of human capital and effects it created on those left behind (in the home
country) either skilled or unskilled (external effect) were the most important com-
ponents of losses while loss from education subsidies were rather limited. On the
other hand, structure of brain gain has clearly shown that remittances are very
low and represent the smallest component of brain gain in SSA. The gains from
endogenized education decisions were the most important for countries combining
small per capita income and small size of brain drain and it was declining with
the two facts while diaspora externality was small for countries combining low
income and low brain drain and outweighted the other gains in countries with
higher brain drain and higher per capita income. It came out that, structurally,
losses from brain drain increase with the size of skilled emigration while gains from
brain drain decrease with an increase in the size of skilled emigration. This is the
mechanism generating the threshold level of brain drain because at a certain level
of skill emigration, losses and gains are equal. Regarding the net effect of brain
drain, our model has revealed that, on average, SSA is a net winner but the gain
has been declining over time. Moreover, this declining pattern has been observed
in three of the four regions of SSA (MA, EA,WA) while SA exhibited a relatively
flat pattern. Those four regions were net winners for average net income response
weighted with the population size; but a simple average has shown that MA and
EA ended up net losers. Futhermore, even if the model revealed that SSA as a
whole was a net winner, there were more winners than losers. Gains have been
declining over time and the number countries loosing has been increasing with
a mechanical decline in the number of countries winning. Finally, our findings
pointed out the persistence of net loss showing that, most often in SSA, once a
country has became a loser, it remains there.
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Appendix 1: Mathematical calculation of Skilled emigration loss in
absence of externality
Let’s consider Y = f(K,N) where N = L −M , N being resident labour
force in home country and M being the number of migrants. K is consider as being
internationally immobile.
The change in national income due because of the de´parture of migrants is given
by:
∆YN =
[
K
∂r
∂N
+ L
∂w
∂N
]
∆N
Where ∆N = M
Prouv:
∂r
∂N
and
∂w
∂N
are define as average rate at N = L and at N = L−M . This average
is defined as:
Avg.
∂r
∂N
=
1
2
[
∂r
∂N
N=L +
∂r
∂N
N=L−M
]
Avg.
∂w
∂N
=
1
2
[
∂w
∂N
N=L +
∂w
∂N
N=L−M
]
So, knowing that at N = L, ∆YN = 0 because the only change is supposed to
come from emigration, we remain with:
Avg.
∂r
∂N
=
1
2
∂r
∂N
N=L−M and Avg.
∂w
∂N
=
1
2
∂w
∂N
N=L−M
Thus, at N = L − M , ∆YN =
1
2
[
K
∂r
∂N
+ L
∂w
∂N
]
∆N . As a share of national
production, this emigration loss can be expressed as:
∆YN
Y
=
1
2
[
K
∂r
∂N
+ L
∂w
∂N
]
∆N
Y
=
1
2
[
K
Y
∂r
∂N
N
r
r
N
+
L
Y
∂w
∂N
N
w
w
N
]
∆N
=
1
2
[
dlnr
dlnN
rK
Y
+
dlnw
dlnN
wN
Y
L
N
]
∆N
N
=
1
2
[
dlnr
dlnN
(
1− wN
Y
)
+
dlnw
dlnN
wN
Y
(
1− M
N
)]
M
N
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37
=
1
2 [(1− s) eKN + s (1−m) eNN ]m
Thus,
∆YN
Y
=
1
2 [(1− s) eKN + s (1−m) eNN ]m
Where s = wN/Y ; m = M/N ; eKN = dlnr/dlnN ; eKN = dlnw/dlnN . In line
with Hamermesh(1993), a weighted average of factor price elasticities adds up to
zero, so that (1− s) eKN + seNN = 0. Thus, the emigration Loss is given by:
∆YN
Y
= −12seNNm
2
For simplicity, we will consider e instead of eNN so that ∆YN/Y = −1/2sem2.
For a C.E.S production function, e =
1− s
σ
, thus
∆YN
Y
= −12
s (1− s)m2
σ
Where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Now, if we consider only skilled migrants, the skilled emigration loss will become:
∆YN
Y
= −12
sh
(
1− sh
)
(mh)2
σ
We do obtain the expression of equation (4)
37Since the production function is homogenous of degre 1.
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Appendix 2: Mathematical calculation of Skilled emigration loss in
presence of externality
In presence of externalities, since firms ignore them, the production function
of th representative firm will be given by YF = f(K,N)Y γE and inputs prices given
by marginal productivity conditions: r = (∂f/∂K)Y γE and w = (∂f/∂N)Y
γ
E .
Equation (2) still gives the emigration loss under the existence of externalities.
Then, marginal products are calculated under the equilibrium conditions of
Y = f(K,N)1/(1−γ)
; that is
Y =
[
δKρ + (1− δ)Nρ)
]1/ρ(1−γ)
.
When skill structure is taking in to account, and given that skilled emigration
affects both skilled and unskilled workers left in the home country, our production
function become:
Y =
[
δ1K
ρ + δ2(Nh)
ρ + (1− δ1 − δ2)(N l)ρ
]1/ρ(1−γ)
∂w
∂N
and
∂r
∂N
are calucalted using the equilibrium condition at point N = L−M .
Then, once those partial derivatives are obtained, we therefore apply
∆YN
Y
=
1
2
[
K
∂r
∂N
+ L
∂w
∂N
]
∆N
Y
to obtain the expression of emigration loss reported in the text (equation 7):
∆YN
Y
=
1
2
sh(1− sh)(mh)2
σ
+
γ shi m
h
i
1− γ
(
1− shmh
)
+
γ slmh
1− γ
(
1− slmh
)
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Appendix 3: Sample description
Total sample Eastern Africa Middle Africa Southern Africa Western Africa
Angola Burundi Angola Botswana Benin
Benin Comoros Cameroon Lesotho Burkina Faso
Botswana Eritrea Central Africa R. Namibia Cape Verde
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Chad South Africa Cote d’Ivoire
Burundi Kenya D. R. Congo Swaziland Gambia
Cape Verde Madagascar Congo Ghana
Cameroon Malawi Equatorial Gui. Guinea
Central African R. Mauritius Gabon Guinea Bissau
Chad Mozambique Sao Tome Liberia
Comoros Rwanda Mali
D. R. Congo Seychelles Mauritania
Congo Somalia Niger
Cote d’Ivoire Sudan Nigeria
Equatorial Gui. Tanzania Senegal
Eritrea Uganda Sierra Leone
Ethiopia Zambia Togo
Gabon Zimbabwe
Gambia
Chana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Maurititus
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome´
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Appendix 4: Do skilled migrant remit less in SSA?
One of the most important difficulty when researchers try to find out whether
remittances offset losses due to brain drain in the source country is the lack of of-
ficial data on remittances from skilled workers. So, those studies will mechanically
overestimate the offsetting power of remittances. At least, one might argue that
the largest share of remittances should come from skilled migrants since they earn
higher wages in the host countries compared to unskilled migrants. While they
typically earn more and so might be expected to remit more, skilled migrants are
also more likely to stay in the host country for long and to reunite with their
close family in the host country. This latter argument should be associated with
smaller propensity to remit. So, the impact of brain drain on remittances remain
an empirical question. Authors such as Faini (2002, 2006, 2007); Niimi, Odzen and
Schiff (2010) have evidenced that skilled migrations are associated with a lower
propensity to remit. But, a recent study by Bollard, Mckenzie and Morten (2010)
using a large sample of about 12 000 Africans immigrants living in OECD coun-
tries have evidenced that remittances are positively and significantly associated to
skilled emigration. Otherwise, skilled migrants remit more than unskilled. This
opposition of view highlight the fact that the pattern of remittances with respect
to skill structure (who remit more?) remains an opened question.
In this study, since we need to estimate the share of remittances sent by
skilled migrants, we have to look some insights from our data (data from Brucker
et al(2013)). Figure 6 below reports the scatter plot of per capita remittances on
the share of skilled migrants in the total stock of migrants for different years 1980,
1990, 2000 and 2010.
From this figure, except for 1980, it is obvious to see that, remittances
have been negatively associated to the share of skilled migrants (1990, 2000 and
2010); supporting the idea that skilled migrants are likely to remit less. Still,
the slope of the curve is quite small (the curve is quite flat) and this make the
conclusion very difficult. We have then chosen to verify it empirically using an
econometric investigation.
The equation describing determinants of remittances is inspired from studies of
both Faini (2007) and Niimi, Odzen and Schiff (2010) and expressed as:
Rpi,t = α0 + α1Rpi,t−1 + α2mhi,t + β
′
Xi,t + i,t (23)
Where X is a vector of other explanatories variables used as determinants
of remittances (migration rate, medium skilled migration rate, per capita income
and population size).
As highlighted by Faini (2007), Niimi et al (2010), migration is endogenous
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Figure 15: Per capita remittances and the share of skilled migrants
Source: Authors’ construction from BCM (2013)
since sending remittances is one of the main reason of migration. So, instruments
they use for migration in order to deal with the issue of endogeneity are distance
between home and host country, cost of obtaining a passport as share of per capita
income, dummies for landlock country, island, acceptance of dual citizenship, and
where English is spoken. While those studies were almost cross sectional analy-
sis even if Faini (2007) did a panel data with two period (1990 and 2000), our
own study is an extended panel data study over the period (1980 - 2010) with
five years interval. Both Faini (2007) and Niimi et al (2010) used instrumental
variable (IV) technic. But regarding instruments they used, most of them are not
likely to change over time (landlock, distance between home and host country,
Island)while variable they are instrumented change with time and thus appears as
being inefficient in a dynamic analysis. In order to deal with this issue, we use
Arellano and Bond (1991)General Method of Moment (GMM) approach which use
differentiated explanatories variables as instruments and then we include instru-
ments present above as additional instruments. Results are presented in the table
5 below.
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Table 5: Impact of brain drain on remittances in SSA (1980-2010)
Dependent variable: log of per capita remittances
OLS FE OS DGMM TS DGMM
L.log per capita remittances 0.795*** 0.400*** 0.749*** 0.773***
(0.048) (0.104) (0.122) (0.127)
log emigration rate 0.141 0.710** 0.216 0.014
(0.090) (0.265) (0.640) (0.829)
log med skilled emigration rate -0.125 -0.632 0.113 0.206
(0.085) (0.454) (0.460) (0.484)
log skilled emigration rate 0.018 0.242 -0.781* -0.843**
(0.131) (0.449) (0.446) (0.395)
log per capita income -0.054 -0.833** -0.562 -0.580
(0.091) (0.405) (0.340) (0.361)
log population -0.047 1.501 -0.511 0.479
(0.063) (1.420) (2.442) (2.908)
Constant -88.805*** -101.877**
(19.844) (46.871)
Observation 186 186 155 155
Time dummy YES YES YES YES
AR2 (P-value) N/A N/A 0.96 0.94
Hansen (p-value) N/A N/A 0.256 0.256
Number of instruments N/A N/A 29 29
Number of country N/A 31 31 31
R-Squared 0.792 0.540 N/A N/A
Note: POLS: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE for panel fixed effect, OS DGMM
for One Step Difference Generalized Method of Moment, TS DGMM: Two Step
D-GMM. The first three columns have allowed to choose between difference GMM
and System GMM following the rule of Thumb. Difference GMM has been
chosen. Final results intepreted are those in column four. Additional predefined
instruments such as landlock, distance between home and host country, existence
of dual citizenship, passport cost are used. Variables used are 5 years average
values
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Appendix 5: Evolution of NBG/NBL over the period 1980- 2010
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Appendix 6: Persistence of net losses [1980 - 2010]
The table below present the persistence of losses from brain drain over the
entire period covered by this study for each country experiencing at least one
period loss.
Table 6: Persistence of net losses [1980 - 2010]
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Angola X X X X X X
Cape Verde X X X X X X X
Cameroon X
Comoros X X X
Congo X
Equatorial Guinea X X X X X X
Eritrea X X X X
Gabon X X X X X X
Gambia X X
Ghana X X
Guinea X
Guinea Bissau X X
Kenya X X X X X
Liberia X X X X
Mauritius X X X X X X X
Mozambique X X
Sao Tome X X X X X X X
Seychelles X X X X X X X
Sierra Leone X X X
Somalia X X X X
Swaziland X X X X
Zimbabwe X X
Total 4 8 10 12 14 18 20
Appendix 7: Country specific net income response[1980 - 2010]
The table below provides net income response in percentage of per capita
income of each country for each year from 1980 to 2010 with 5 years interval.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Angola 4.0% -1.2% -0.5% -2.8% -5.3% -7.1% -6.2%
Benin 21.9% 16.2% 15.6% 11.7% 9.8% 7.4% 4.5%
Botswana 25.0% 9.8% 7.6% 5.2% 5.4% 4.9% 3.8%
Burk. Faso 17.5% 14.6% 12.8% 10.0% 8.0% 7.0% 2.6%
Burundi 27.5% 24.1% 23.8% 22.3% 20.2% 14.0% 11.9%
Cape verde -24.1% -22.5% -17.5% -17.7% -13.7% -18.9% -13.5%
Cameroon 19.2% 14.3% 10.8% 7.9% 6.2% 2.9% -0.2%
Central Africa R. 18.9% 15.1% 11.3% 11.6% 11.1% 11.2% 10.0%
Chad 23.7% 20.0% 17.3% 15.3% 12.0% 11.6% 9.5%
Comoros 11.4% 9.7% 7.9% 3.5% -1.0% -1.1% -2.9%
D. R. Congo 22.3% 18.1% 14.6% 12.5% 13.9% 15.3% 14.7%
Congo 6.3% 6.5% 5.8% 3.6% 2.6% 1.7% -0.8%
Cote d’Ivoire 11.6% 10.1% 11.1% 5.7% 3.9% 3.9% 3.2%
Equa. Guinea 15.1% -0.8% -4.7% -5.9% -8.7% -15.4% -14.5%
Eritrea 16.0% 14.1% 10.9% -5.2% -11.3% -11.5% -11.9%
Ethiopia 16.8% 12.6% 9.3% 7.6% 6.7% 4.3% 2.9%
Gabon 1.1% -0.3% -0.1% -1.6% -2.2% -2.2% -3.4%
Gambia 15.6% 7.3% 4.9% 1.5% 2.9% -3.2% -6.8%
Ghana 8.2% 5.2% 3.2% 2.6% 0.3% -2.8% -3.5%
Guinea 14.5% 11.0% 8.8% 7.3% 5.8% 3.8% -0.4%
Guinea-Bissau 16.5% 9.6% 6.3% 0.6% -2.4% -5.6% -3.8%
Kenya 5.3% 1.5% -0.8% -2.6% -4.1% -6.3% -6.9%
Lesotho 39.7% 35.7% 30.8% 25.9% 25.4% 29.3% 27.9%
Liberia 7.9% 1.4% -4.8% -11.3% -12.8% -7.1% 1.0%
Madagascar 11.8% 9.6% 6.9% 6.1% 5.2% 4.7% 3.8%
Malawi 23.3% 18.9% 19.8% 17.2% 18.5% 17.0% 12.5%
Mali 24.1% 21.1% 19.6% 17.6% 13.1% 10.1% 9.1%
Mauritania 15.6% 13.5% 12.6% 8.8% 6.3% 5.6% 6.5%
Mauritius -7.4% -6.4% -13.4% -11.3% -10.8% -18.8% -19.8%
Mozambique 10.3% 0.9% 1.5% 9.7% -3.0% -1.8% 0.2%
Namibia 11.8% 9.5% 8.1% 8.5% 8.2% 10.0% 11.0%
Niger 24.1% 22.4% 22.8% 20.6% 19.3% 18.6% 17.8%
Nigeria 13.9% 10.2% 7.3% 6.7% 4.0% 3.0% 3.9%
Rwanda 36.4% 32.9% 29.4% 24.6% 20.4% 18.4% 15.3%
Sao Tome -28.9% -32.6% -22.9% -25.8% -26.0% -28.1% -24.3%
Senegal 12.0% 10.6% 9.8% 8.8% 11.0% 15.5% 2.3%
Seychelles -21.3% -13.8% -29.5% -33.6% -26.2% -29.6% -24.3%
Sierra Leone 13.7% 6.0% 5.6% 0.5% -7.2% -8.7% -13.3%
Somalia 12.1% 9.0% 2.6% -6.9% -7.5% -12.3% -12.2%
South Africa 20.9% 22.4% 15.7% 14.3% 13.4% 16.2% 16.5%
Sudan 21.4% 22.9% 19.8% 15.3% 10.9% 8.3% 5.7%
Swaziland 6.5% -1.8% -5.7% -0.5% 4.9% 37.0% -4.1%
Tanzania 13.0% 12.9% 11.9% 11.9% 12.1% 10.9% 7.1%
Togo 12.1% 10.9% 9.8% 7.1% 6.2% 5.5% 5.1%
Uganda 6.6% 5.4% 7.1% 4.2% 4.2% 4.9% 6.4%
Zambia 24.5% 15.4% 11.8% 10.0% 7.5% 7.7% 6.2%
Zimbabwe 5.6% 3.6% 3.9% 4.2% 3.3% -1.4% -5.2%
63
Appendix 8: Missing data management
Per capita GDP PPP: For some countries in our sample like Eritrea, Somalia
and Sao Tome, there were not data at all on the covered period and for countries
like Ethiopia, Guinea, Tanzania and Uganda, some observations where missing. In
order to cope with that, with use Gapminder dataset of per capita GDP PPP.
Public spending in education by level of education: This table contents the
summary of actions undertaken to manage the missing data.
Country Year(s) without data Mitigation action
Angola 1980, 1995 Moving average
Benin 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Botswana 2000 Average between 1995 and 2005
Cape Verde 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Cameroon 1980 Situation of 1985 replicated
CAR 1985 Average 1980 and 1990
Chad 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Comoros 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
DRC 1995 - 2005 Situation of 2010 replicated
Congo 1985 - 1990 Moyenne mobile
CIV 1985 - 1990 Moyenne mobile
Equatorial Gui. 1980 - 1995,200-2010 Situation of 2000 replicated
Eritrea 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Ethiopia 1980 Situation of 1985 replicated
Gabon 1980 - 1990, 2005 Replicated 1995 and moving
average 2000 and 2010
Gambia 1980 Situation of 1985 replicated
Guinea 1980 - 1990 Situation of 1995 replicated
Guinea Bissau 1980 - 1995, 2005 Replicated 2000 and average
between 2000 and 2010
Liberia 1980 - 2000 Replicated the situation of 2005
Madagascar 1990 Average between 1985 and 1995
Malawi 1985 Average between 1980 and 1990
Mali 1985 Average between 1980 and 1990
Mauritania 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Mozambique 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Namibia 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Niger 1980 - 1995 Situation of 2000 replicated
Nigeria 1985 - 2010 Situation of 1980 replicated
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Appendix 9: Distribution of SSA countries by country size and in-
come group
By Country Size
Large Countries NGA, ETH, KEN, SFA, SDN, TZA, UGD, DRC
Medium Countries AGO, BFA, CMR, THD, CIV, GHA, MDG, MLI,
MLW, MZB, NGR, SNG, SML, ZMB, ZMB, GN
Small Countries BEN, BRD, CRA, CNG, ERT, LBR, MRT, RWD, SRL, TGO
Very small Countries BTSW, CPV, COM, GNE, GMB, GBN, GNB, LSO, MUS
NMB, STP, SEY, SWZ
By Income Group
LIC BEN, BFA, BRD, CRA, CHD, COM, DRC, ERT, ETH, GMB, GN,
GNB, LBR, MDG, MLW, MLI, MZB, NGR, RWD, SNG, SRL, SML
TZA, TGO, UGD, ZMB
LMIC AGO, CPV, CMR, CNG, CIV, GHA, KEN, LSO, MRT, NGA, STP
SDN, SWZ, ZMB
UMIC BTSW, GNE, GBN, MUS, NMB, SFA
HIC SEY
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